After law firm had performed legal work at behest of malpractice insurer, malpractice insurer went into receivership. The Receiver and Counsel sought compensation and expenses for both the pre and post-petition periods.
Malpractice insurer hired claimant law firm to defend two doctors against malpractice claims. The Receiver did not seek authority to continue in this capacity for the post-petition period yet continued to play an active role in the case primarily by seeking its dismissal.
Any concealment of the books, papers, records, or assets of the regulated entity, or any refusal to submit the books, papers, records, or affairs of the regulated entity, for inspection to any examiner or to any lawful agent of the Director.
The regulated entity has incurred or is likely to incur losses that will deplete all or substantially all of its capital, and there is no reasonable prospect for the regulated entity to become adequately capitalized (as defined in section 4614(a)(1) of this title).
Debtors, who were married, but in separate cases, opposed the motions and the court held a lengthy evidentiary trial. Keir, Chief J., explaining the different analyses of the applicable Bankruptcy Code sections, held that cause existed under both 11 U. The court found that the appropriate remedy was the appointment of a chapter 11 Trustee who could further assess whether there was any means for a financial reorganization. held that assumption of a lease of personal property in chapter 7 pursuant to 11 U. Plaintiff filed a two-count complaint for nondischargeability of debt pursuant to 11 U. Prior to the settlement with the Plaintiff and unbeknownst to it, Debtor granted an indemnity deed of trust in favor of non-party private investors, securing it with the same real property that was to be pledged to the Plaintiff. The Debtor argued that there is no second meeting of creditors held pursuant to 341(a) upon conversion and thus the deadlines do not reset.
Held, because law firm’s claim would only be enforceable under state law against malpractice insurer, debtor’s objection to claim was sustained. Debtor’s breach of non-competition clause in pre-petition employment contract, accompanied by tortious conduct that amounted to fraud, misrepresentation and breach of fiduciary duty to the plaintiff, resulted in a finding that the resulting damages were non-dischargeable pursuant to 11 U. Motions for appointment of chapter 11 trustees or alternatively for conversion were filed by the purported largest secured creditor, alleging, inter alia, dishonesty, mismanagement and futility. § 1104 and § 1112 for appointment of a trustee, dismissal or conversion. § 365(p)(2) does not require court approval but that the underlying indebtedness will be discharged by the discharge order entered in the Debtors’ case unless reaffirmed in compliance with the provisions of 11 U. As being the same business as that of the debtor, the purchaser’s offer did not test the value of the KERP as a competing offer. Plaintiff was to receive a first lien on the real property when the loan was settled. Held, the failure to file a report of federal adjustment did not render tax debt to the State nondischargeable under 11 U. Creditor filed complaint to determine State court judgment nondischargeable for fraud under 11 U. The state court appointed Receiver of the Debtor (Receiver) and his Counsel filed separate motions seeking allowance of compensation and expenses incurred as administrative expense claims pursuant to 11 U. Plaintiff moved for summary judgment in adversary proceeding on grounds that collateral estoppel applied to render state court judgment for defamation and abuse of process nondischargeable as a debt for willful and malicious injury under 11 U. The Chapter 7 trustee filed a timely objection to a portion of the newly exempted property and an amended objection within thirty days of the conclusion of the post-conversion 11 U. The fundamental issue raised is whether the deadlines for objecting to exemptions set forth in Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 4003(b) automatically re-set following conversion so that the trustee and creditors are granted two thirty day periods to object to amended exemptions previously listed by a debtor; thirty days following the amendment and an additional thirty days following the conclusion of the 11 U. C § 341(a) meeting of creditors held in the converted case.
Authority to require reports by regulated entities.
The law firm filed a claim against the debtor, and the debtor, succeeded in interest by a Plan Trust, objected to claim of law firm. Valkenet Trustee sought preferential avoidance of deed of trust perfected within 90 days prior to bankruptcy petition date. Keir, Chief J., held that the creditor was entitled to be equitably subrogated to the lien position held prior to the refinance transaction despite recording its new lien beyond ten days after the promissory note was signed on a date within the preference period and filing a certificate of satisfaction prior to recordation of its new lien. Debtors, who were married, but in separate cases, opposed the motions and the court held a lengthy evidentiary trial. Keir, Chief J., explaining the different analyses of the applicable Bankruptcy Code sections, held that cause existed under both 11 U. The court found that the appropriate remedy was the appointment of a chapter 11 Trustee who could further assess whether there was any means for a financial reorganization. (In the matter of the Administrative Claim of Moody’s Wall Street Analytics) Held, (1) Chapter 11 debtor corporation had standing to reject executory contract notwithstanding the fact that the debtor’s parent corporation was the contracting party and not the debtor, where the obligee demanded payment from the debtor and the debtor was unwittingly in possession of the claimant’s computer equipment on the petition date; (2) debtor may reject an executory contract to which it was not a party in the exercise of its sound business judgment based upon the reasonable belief that the debtor might be liable for performance of the contract; (3) debtor’s rejection of an executory contract is not an acknowledgment of indebtedness per se; (4) while rejection of an executory contract may give rise to an unsecured claim and/or an administrative claim against the bankruptcy estate for breach of contract, administrative claimant seeking rejection damages bears burdens of proving damages and that the debtor was obligated to perform the contract, particularly where the debtor is not a party to the rejected contract, but might be liable on some other basis; (5) debtor’s rejection of an executory contract to which it was not a party did not give rise to a claim for any damages against the bankruptcy estate where administrative claimant failed to prove both debtor’s obligation to perform the contract and that debtor’s rejection thereof caused damage to the claimant. Held, Section 503(c)(1) requirements not satisfied by the agreement of the purchaser of Chapter 11 debtor corporation’s stock (pursuant to confirmed plan) to pay the same compensation as that proposed by the KERP, because the agreement to match the debtor’s KERP was not a bona fide job offer as not coming from a different business, and therefore not an offer in competition with the KERP. The Debtor, an experienced real estate developer, sought to refinance an existing loan secured by a first lien on the real property at issue. Furthermore, the court found that the automatic stay did not apply to Florida actions that had been commenced against the officers, employees and shareholders pursuant to 11 U. In complaint for declaratory judgment that tax debt owed to State of Maryland for years 1992 to 1996 was dischargeable in bankruptcy, debtor had filed returns for those tax years but had not filed a report of federal adjustment after the IRS audited her and found additional income. § 523(a)(1)(B)(i) because a report of federal adjustment is not the type of “equivalent report” of which the failure to file would render tax debt nondischargeable. Held, collateral estoppel did not apply to render State court judgment nondischargeable under 523(a)(2)(A) because it was not based on the debtor’s intent not to perform a contract; further, collateral estoppel did not apply to render State court judgment nondischargeable under 523(a)(2)(B) because it was not based upon a written misrepresentation of financial ability. The Court, in concluding pursuant to well established law that a genuine benefit to the estate must be established, found that: (1) conclusory and bald averments that the Receiver and Counsel’s work tended toward the preservation and benefit of the estate was not sufficient; (2) reduced compensation for the Receiver would be awarded only for the ten-day pre-petition period; (3) Counsel was not entitled to any compensation, as his time records did not provide any evidence that his work tended toward the preservation or benefit of the estate. Debtor filed an amended list of exemptions on the eve of a consensual conversion from Chapter 11 to Chapter 7. § 341(a) meeting, objecting to the remaining exemptions taken.
Subsequently, the debtor filed a Chapter 11 bankruptcy petition. Motions for appointment of chapter 11 trustees or alternatively for conversion were filed by the purported largest secured creditor, alleging, inter alia, dishonesty, mismanagement and futility. § 1104 and § 1112 for appointment of a trustee, dismissal or conversion. Without such reaffirmation, any waiver of discharge contained in the assumption agreement is ineffective. district court (which held that certain key employees of the Chapter 11 debtor were officers and therefore subject to the provisions of Section 503(c)(1) as insiders of the debtor), the issue was whether any of five employees could satisfy limitations set forth in the statute in order to receive payments under a Key Employee Retention Plan (“KERP”). § 362(a)(3) as the actions did not seek to obtain possession of, or control assets of the bankruptcy estate. State court judgment was entered after debtors filed one page pro se answer but did not appear for trial. The Receiver served in this capacity for the ten-day pre-petition period and was superseded by the commencement of the bankruptcy case pursuant to 11 U. The Receiver and Counsel argued that it was not necessary that their actions contributed a substantial benefit to the estate for an award of fees but instead that the Court should rule in their favor because their activities could reasonably have been thought to be beneficial to the estate when they were performed. Held, collateral estoppel rendered state court judgment for defamation nondischargeable because (1) issue of malice had been necessarily litigated in state court; plaintiff was a public official and therefore was constitutionally required to prove actual malice to obtain a judgment for defamation; (2) the issue of willfulness, defined as intent to cause injury, was necessarily litigated in state court because conduct was defamatory per se, creating a presumption of intent to cause injury, and state court trial transcript did not show rebuttal of presumption; (3) collateral estoppel rendered state court judgment for abuse of process nondischargeable because judgment was necessarily based on findings of willfulness and malice.
Notwithstanding any other provision of Federal or State law, the Director may appoint the Agency as conservator or receiver for a regulated entity in the manner provided under paragraph (2) or (4).
All references to the conservator or receiver under this section are references to the Agency acting as conservator or receiver.